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Abstract
We first show that the convex effect algebras (CEA) approach to
quantum mechanics is more general than the general probabilistic the-
ories approach. We then restrict our attention to finite-dimension
CEA’s. After an introductory Section 1, we present basic definitions
in Section 2. Section 3 studies convex subeffect algebras and observ-
ables. In Section 4 we consider strong CEA’s and strong observables.
We show that a CEA is strong if and only if it is classical. Information-
ally complete observables on classical CEA’s are studied in Section 5.
Section 6 considers quantum CEA’s in Hilbert spaces.
1 Introduction
Various types of stochastic theories have recently been important in studies
of quantum mechanics and its generalization. The two types that we shall
consider here are general probabilistic theories (GPT) [3, 5, 6, 11, 13] and
convex effect algebras (CEA) [8, 9, 10]. The central role in these theories
is played by the set of effects E and the set of states S. The effects cor-
respond to yes-no measurements or experiments and the states correspond
to preparation procedures that specify the initial conditions of the system
being measured. Usually, each effect a and state s experimentally determine
a probability P (a, s) ∈ [0, 1] that the effect a occurs when the system has
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been prepared in the state s. Simple and physically motivated properties of
P (a, s) determine a mathematical structure for the sets E and S.
This structure is given in terms of an ordered linear space V [14, 16].
The sets E and S are then represented by certain subsets of V and its dual
space V ∗ which we discuss in detail in Section 2. We shall show that GPT
and CEA determine two different ways of viewing the pair (V, V ∗). From
the GPT viewpoint, the set of states is considered basic and is described by
a set S ⊆ V while the set of effects is secondary with E ⊆ V ∗. From the
CEA viewpoint, E is considered basic with E ⊆ V while S is secondary with
S ⊆ V ∗. Roughly speaking, GPT and CEA are dual viewpoints. However,
GPT results in a stronger structure involving an order-determining set of
states, while CEA is more general. The two viewpoints are equivalent when
this order-determining set of states condition holds. Since CEA is more
general, we shall employ this viewpoint for the remainder of the paper. We
also restrict our discussion to finite-dimensional spaces V . Although this is a
strong restriction, it includes theories of quantum computation and quantum
information [12, 15].
Section 3 presents the basic definitions of the theory and compares the
GPT and CEA viewpoints. In Section 3 we characterize convex subeffect
algebras of a CEA. In Section 4 we consider strong CEA’s and strong ob-
servables. We show that a CEA is strong if and only if it is classical. In-
formationally complete observables on classical CEA’s are characterized in
Section 5. Moreover, a necessary but not sufficient condition and a sufficient
but not necessary condition for a pair of observables to be informationally
complete is presented. Finally, Section 6 considers quantum CEA’s in Hilbert
space.There is some overlap between this work and that given in [5]. We in-
clude this to make the present article self-contained.
2 Basic Definitions
Let V be a real linear space with zero 0. A subset K of V is a positive cone if
R+K ⊆ K, K +K ⊆ K and K ∩ (−K) = {0}. For x, y ∈ V we define x ≤ y
if y − x ∈ K. Then ≤ is a partial order on V and we call (V,K) an ordered
linear space with positive cone K [14, 16]. We say that K is generating if
V = K −K. Let u ∈ K with u 6= 0 and form the interval
[0, u] = {x ∈ K : x ≤ u}
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For x ∈ [0, u], we call x′ = u − x ∈ [0, u] the complement of x. It is easy to
check that [0, u] is a convex subset of V and λx ∈ [0, u] for all λ ∈ [0, 1] ⊆ R,
x ∈ [0, u]. We say that [0, u] is generating if K = R+ [0, u] and V = K −K.
If E = [0, u] is generating, we call E a convex effect algebra (CEA). (It can
be shown [10, 14] that V is a normed space but this will not be needed if V
is finite-dimensional which we assume later.) For a, b ∈ E , if a + b ∈ E we
write a ⊥ b. Then ⊥ and ≤ determine each other in the sense that a ⊥ b if
and only if a ≤ b′.
The dual V ∗ of V is the set of (bounded) linear functionals f : V → R.
We define
V ∗+ = {f ∈ V
∗ : f(x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ K}
Then (V ∗, V ∗+) becomes an ordered linear space called the dual of (V,K). A
state on V is an element s ∈ V ∗+ satisfying s(u) = 1 and we denote the set of
states by S. The elements of E = [0, u] represent effects, 0 is the effect that
is always false (no) and u is the effect that is always true (yes). If a ∈ E ,
s ∈ S, then s(a) gives the probability that a is true in the state s. Of course,
s(a) ∈ [0, 1] and s(a + b) = s(a) + s(b) whenever a ⊥ b. We say that S
is order-determining if s(a) ≤ s(b) for every s ∈ S implies that a ≤ b. In
general, S is not order-determining [10]. We call (E ,S) a CEA viewpoint of
a physical system. In this case, E serves the primary role and S is secondary.
To consider the GPT viewpoint, let (V,K) again be an ordered linear
space and let u ∈ V ∗+ with u 6= 0. In this case, the set of states S serves the
primary role where
S = {s ∈ K : u(s) = 1}
Then S is a convex set which we can assume generates K [5, 6]. The set
of effects E = [0, u] ⊆ V ∗+ is now secondary and if a ∈ E , s ∈ S, the a(s)
represents the probability that a is true in the state s. If a ∈ V ∗ then a ∈ V ∗+
if and only if a(v) ≥ 0 for every v ∈ K which is equivalent to a(s) ≥ 0 for
every s ∈ S. Hence, if a, b ∈ E , then a ≤ b if and only if b − a ≥ 0. This is
equivalent to (b− a)(s) ≥ 0 for all s ∈ S which holds when a(s) ≤ b(s). We
conclude that E has an order-determining set of states S.
The main difference between the CEA and GPT viewpoints is that in
the latter there is an order-determining set of states while in the former this
need not hold. It can be shown that if S is order-determining on E , then
the two viewpoints are equivalent, each being the dual of the other [10]. In
this case, (E ,S, P ) forms a effect-state space where P : S × E → [0, 1] given
by P (s, a) = s(a) is the probability function. We conclude that the CEA
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viewpoint is more general than the GPS viewpoint. For this reason, we shall
employ the CEA viewpoint in the sequel.
We shall also assume that the linear space V is finite-dimensional. Of
course, this is a strong restriction, but it saves us from considering technical
topological details. This finite-dimensional framework is strong enough to
include the theory of quantum computation and quantum information which
has been important recently [12, 15].
3 Convex Subeffect Algebras
In the sequel, we shall assume that E = [0, u] is a CEA where [0, u] is a
generating interval in a finite-dimensional ordered linear space V . If dim V =
n, we define dim E = n. A subset F ⊆ E is a convex subeffect algebra (CSEA)
of E if 0, u ∈ F , a ∈ F implies that a′ = u− a ∈ F , λa ∈ F for every a ∈ F ,
λ ∈ [0, 1] ⊆ R and a, b ∈ F with a ⊥ b implies that a+ b ∈ F .
Lemma 3.1. Let F be a CSEA of E . (i) F is a convex subset of E in the
sense that a, b ∈ F , λ ∈ [0, 1] imply that λa + (1 − λ)b ∈ F . (ii) If n ∈ N,
a ∈ F and na ≤ u, then na ∈ F . (iii) If λ ∈ R with λ ≥ 0 and a ∈ F ,
λa ≤ u, then λa ∈ F . (iv) If a, b ∈ F and b ≤ a, then a− b ∈ F .
Proof. (i) Since λa ≤ a, (1− λ)b ≤ b we have that λa, (1− λ)b ∈ F . Since
λa+ (1− λ)b ≤ λu+ (1− λ)u = u
we have that λa ⊥ (1− λ)b. Hence, λa+ (1− λ)b ∈ F .
(ii) We prove the result by induction on n. The result surely holds for n = 1.
Suppose the result holds for n ≥ 1 and (n + 1)a ≤ u. Then na + a ≤ u and
since na ≤ u we have that na ∈ F . Since na ⊥ a and a ∈ F we have that
(n+ 1)a = na + a ∈ F
which proves the result by induction. (iii) If λ ≤ 1, then λa ∈ F so suppose
that λ > 1. Letting ⌊λ⌋ be the integer part of λ and µ = λ − ⌊λ⌋ we
have that 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1 and λ = ⌊λ⌋ + µ. Since ⌊λ⌋a ≤ λa and λa ∈ E we
have that ⌊λ⌋a ∈ E . By (ii) we have that ⌊λ⌋a ∈ F and µa ∈ F . Since
⌊λ⌋a + µa = λa ∈ E we have that ⌊λ⌋a ⊥ µa. Hence, λa ∈ F . (iv) Since
b ≤ (a′)′ we have that
(a− b)′ = u− (a− b) = b+ (u− a) = b+ a′ ∈ F
Hence, a− b ∈ F .
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Theorem 3.2. Let E = [0, u] ⊆ V be a CEA. Then F ⊆ E is a CSEA of
E if and only if there exists a linear subspace V1 of V such that u ∈ V1 and
F = [0, u] ∩ V1 = E ∩ V1.
Proof. If F = [0, u] ∩ V1 with u ∈ V1, then clearly F is a CSEA of E .
Conversely, let F be a CSEA of E . Let V1 be the subspace of V generated
by F . Then u ∈ V1 and we shall show that F = [0, u] ∩ V1. If a ∈ F , then
a ∈ V1 and a ∈ E so a ∈ [0, u] ∩ V1. Conversely, suppose a ∈ [0, u] ∩ V1. If
a = 0, then clearly a ∈ F and if a 6= 0, then a =
∑
λiai, ai ∈ F , λi ∈ R,
λi 6= 0. We can write
a =
∑
αibi −
∑
βici
where αi, βi > 0, bi, ci ∈ F . Letting λ =
∑
αi, µ =
∑
βi
b =
∑
αi
λ
bi, c =
∑
βi
µ
ci
we obtain b, c ∈ F , λ, µ > 0 and a = λb− µc. Now 0 ≤ λb− µc ≤ u implies
that
µc ≤ λb ≤ u+ µc ≤ (1 + µ)u
Hence,
0 ≤ µ
1+µ
c ≤ λ
1+µ
b ≤ u
It follows from Lemma 3.1(iii) that λ
1+µ
b ∈ F and by Lemma 3.1(iv) we have
that
d = λ
1+µ
b− µ
1−µ
c ∈ F
Since (1 + µ)d = a ∈ [0, u], by Lemma 3.1(iii) we obtain a ∈ F . Hence,
F = [0, u] ∩ V1.
Applying Theorem 3.2, we conclude that F = [0, u] ⊆ V1 where [0, u]
generates V1 and dimF = dimV1. Hence, a CSEA is a CEA in its own right.
If F1 = E ∩ V1, F2 = E ∩ V2 are CSEA’s of E , it is clear that
F1 ∩ F2 = E ∩ V1 ∩ V2
is the largest CSEA contained in F1 and F2 and we write F1∧F2 = F1∩F2.
If
F1 ∩ F2 = {a ∈ E : a = λu, λ ∈ [0, u]}
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we say that F1 and F2 are separated. In this case, F1 ∩ F2 is isomorphic to
[0, 1] and V1 ∩ V2 is isomorphic to R. The smallest CSEA of E containing F1
and F2 is
F1 ∨ F2 = E ∩ (V1 ∨ V2)
where V1 ∨ V2 is the subspace of V generated by V1 and V2. If F1 and F2 are
separated, then
dim(F1 ∨ F2) = dimF1 + dimF2 − 1
Corollary 3.3. F is a CSEA of E if and only if there exist linearly inde-
pendent effects a1, a2, . . ., am ∈ E such that
∑
riai = u for some ri ∈ R
and
F =
{
a ∈ E : a =
∑
λiai, λi ∈ R
}
(3.1)
Proof. If a1, . . . , am ∈ E satisfying the given conditions, it is easy to verify
that F is a CSEA of E . Conversely, if F is a CSEA of E , then by Theorem 3.2,
there exists a linear subspace V1 of V such that u ∈ V1 and F = [0, u] ∩ V1.
Let v1, v2, . . . , vr be a basis for V1. Since F generates V1, every vi has the
form vi = αiv
+
i − βiv
−
i , v
+
i , v
−
i ∈ F , αi, βi ≥ 0. Let bi = v
+
i , i = 1, 2, . . . , r
and bi = v
−
i−r, i = r + 1, r + 2, . . . , 2r. Since {vi} is a basis for V1, we
have that
∑
ribi = u for some ri ∈ R. Also, since {vi} is a basis, (3.1)
holds with ai replaced by bi. Replacing {bi} by a linearly independent subset
{a1, a2, . . . , am} we obtain
∑
riai = u for some ri ∈ R and (3.1). Since {ai}
generates V1 we have that m = r.
We conclude from the proof of Corollary 3.3 that dimF = m and we
call a1, a2, . . . , am in Corollary 3.3 generators of F . Although the ai are not
unique, m is unique.
An effect a ∈ E is strong if a 6≤ λu for all λ ∈ [0, 1). If we strengthen the
properties of the generators in Corollary 3.3, we obtain an interesting special
type of CSEA.
Lemma 3.4. Let a1, a2, . . . , am ∈ E be strong, linearly independent and sat-
isfy
∑
ai = u. Then
F =
{
a ∈ E : a =
∑
λiai, λi ∈ [0, 1]
}
(3.2)
is a CSEA of E .
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Proof. The only condition that is not evident is that a, b ∈ F with a ⊥ b
implies a + b ∈ F . We then suppose that a, b ∈ F with a ⊥ b where a =∑
λiai, b =
∑
µiai, λi, µi ∈ [0, u]. Then a+ b ∈ E and a+ b =
∑
(λi+µi)ai.
Since
(λi + µi)ai ≤ a + b ≤ u
we have that ai ≤ (λi + µi)
–1u (we can assume λi 6= 0 or µi 6= 0). Since ai is
strong, we have that (λi + µi)
–1 ≥ 1 so λi + µi ≤ 1, i = 1, 2, . . . , m. Hence,
a+ b ∈ F .
4 Strong Convex Effect Algebras
Motivated by Lemma 3.4 we say that a CEA E is strong if there exist a
linearly independent set of effects {a1, a2, . . . , an} such that
∑
ai = u and
E =
{∑
λiai : λi ∈ [0, 1]
}
We see that the CEA F in Lemma 3.4 is strong. We call the ai in the
previous definition generators of E . We now show that the generators are
automatically strong.
Lemma 4.1. If E is a strong CEA with generators {ai}, then ai is strong
for all i.
Proof. Suppose that aj is not strong so that aj ≤ λu, λ ∈ (0, 1). Then
λ–1aj ∈ E and λ
–1 > 1. Let 0 < µ < 1 with µ < (1−λ)λ–1. Then aj, µaj ∈ E
and since 1 + µ < λ–1 we have that
aj + µaj = (1 + µ)aj ≤ λ
–1aj
Hence, aj + µaj ∈ E so we have that
(1 + µ)aj =
∑
λiai, λi ∈ [0, 1]
Since representations are unique we conclude that λj = 1+µ > 1 which gives
a contradiction. Hence, aj is strong for all j.
An effect a in a CEA E is sharp if a∧ a′ = 0 [8]. That is, if b ∈ E satisfies
b ≤ a, a′ then b = 0. It is clear that 0 and u are sharp. Physically, an effect
is sharp if it is precisely yes or no when measured [8].
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Lemma 4.2. If a 6= 0 is sharp, then a is strong.
Proof. If a is not strong, then a ≤ λu for some λ ∈ (0, 1). Hence,
a′ ≥ (λu)′ = (1− λ)u
Now (1− λ)a ≤ a and (1− λ)a ≤ (1− λ)u ≤ a′. Since (1− λ)a 6= 0, a is not
sharp.
An observable on a CEA E with finite outcome set X is a map A : X → E
satisfying ∑
x∈X
A(x) = u (4.1)
We sometimes write A = {A(x1), . . . , A(xn)} and interpret A as a measure-
ment with values x1, . . . , xn such that A(xi) is the effect that occurs when
A has the value xi. For example, the generators of a strong CEA form an
observable A : {1, . . . , n} → E given by A(i) = ai. The condition (4.1) says
that A must have one of the values A(x), x ∈ X . If s is a state on E ,
then s(A(x)) ∈ [0, 1] gives the probability that A has the value x when the
system is in state s. Of course, this gives a probability measure because∑
s(A(x)) = s(u) = 1. An observable A is strong if A(x) are linearly in-
dependent and strong. It follows from Lemma 4.1 that the generators of a
strong CEA form a strong observable.
Two effects a, b ∈ E coexist if there exist effects a1, b1, c ∈ E such that
a1 + b1 + c ∈ E and a = a1 + c, b = b1 + c [3, 12]. This terminology stems
from the fact that we can then form the observable A = {a1, b1, c, d} where
d = (a1 + b1 + c)
′ and we can measure a and b simultaneously by measuring
the single observable A.
Lemma 4.3. If E is a strong CEA and b, c ∈ E , then b and c coexist.
Proof. Let {ai} be a set of generators for E . Then b =
∑
λiai, c =
∑
µiai,
λi, µi ∈ [0, 1]. Define
d =
∑
min(λi, µi)ai ∈ E
Then b1 = b− d, c1 = c− d ∈ E and
b1 + c1 + d = b+ c− d =
∑
[λi + µi −min(λi, µi)] ai
=
∑
max(λi, µi)ai ≤ u
Hence, b1 + c1 + d ∈ E and b = b1 + d, c = c1 + d. Therefore, b and c
coexist.
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A classical channel between outcome spaces X and Y is given by a
stochastic matrix νxy, x ∈ X , y ∈ Y with 0 ≤ νxy ≤ 1 and
∑
y∈Y νxy = 1 for
all x ∈ X . We interpret νxy as the transition probability that outcome x is
mapped into outcome y [5, 6, 11]. For an observable A with outcome space
X and a classical channel ν from X to Y , we define a new observable ν ◦ A
on Y by
(ν ◦ A)(y) =
∑
x∈X
νxyA(x)
for all y ∈ Y . Physically, ν ◦ A is interpreted as first measuring A and then
employing the classical channel ν on each measurement outcome [5, 6, 11].
For two observables A and B, we say that B is a postprocessing of A denoted
by A→ B if there exists a classical channel ν such that B = ν ◦ A.
Theorem 4.4. Let A = {ai} be an observable with linearly independent
elements ai in a CEA E . Then E is strong with generators ai if and only if
every observable in E is a postprocessing of A.
Proof. Let E be strong with generators A = {a1, a2, . . . , an}. We view X =
{1, 2, . . . , n} as an outcome space and write
A = {ax : x ∈ X} = {A(x) : x ∈ X}
Now let B = {B(y) : y ∈ Y } be another observable in E . Then B(y) ∈ E
so we have that B(y) =
∑
x∈X νxyA(x) where 0 ≤ νxy ≤ 1. Since B is an
observable, we conclude that
u =
∑
y∈Y
B(y) =
∑
x
[∑
y
νxy
]
A(x)
Letting µx =
∑
y∈Y νxy we have that
∑
x∈X µxA(x) = u. If µx > 1 for some
x ∈ X , then since µxA(x) ≤ u we have that A(x) ≤ (µx)
–1u. But this
contradicts the fact that A is strong. Hence, µx ≤ 1 for all x ∈ X . If µx < 1
for some x ∈ X , then
u =
∑
x∈X
µxA(x) <
∑
x∈X
A(x) = u
which is a contradiction. Hence,
∑
y∈Y νxy = µx = 1 for x ∈ X so A → B.
Conversely, suppose every observable in E is a postprocessing of A. If a ∈ E ,
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then B = {a, a′} is an observable in E so A → B. Hence, there exists
νij ∈ [0, 1], i = 1, 2, . . . , n, j = 1, 2 such that
a = B(1) =
∑
νi1ai
We conclude that E is strong with generators {ai}
Let E1 = [0, u1], E2 = [0, u2] be CEA’s. A morphism from E1 to E2 is a
map φ : E1 → E2 satisfying φ(u1) = u2 and a, b ∈ E1 with a ⊥ b implies that
φ(a) ⊥ φ(b) and φ(a + b) = φ(a) + φ(b). A morphism φ : E1 → E2 satisfying
φ(a) ⊥ φ(b) implies that a ⊥ b is a monomorphism. It is easy to check that
a monomorphism is injective. Also, if φ is a surjective monomorphism, then
φ–1 is a morphism and we call φ an isomorphism. If φ is an isomorphism
that satisfies φ(λa) = λφ(a) for all λ ∈ [0, 1], a ∈ E1, then φ is an affine
isomorphism and we say that E1 and E2 are affinely isomorphic [10].
For n ∈ N, let Rn = {(a1, a2, . . . , an) : ai ∈ R} be the real linear space
with
(a1, a2, . . . , an) + (b1, b2, . . . , bn) = (a1 + b1, a2 + b2, . . . , an + bn)
and λ(a1, a2, . . . , an) = (λa1, λa2, . . . , λan). Let
Kn = {(a1, a2, . . . , an) : ai ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , n}
be a positive cone in Rn. Letting un = (1, 1, . . . , 1) we see that Sn = [0, un] is
a generating interval for the ordered linear space, (Rn, Kn) so Sn is a CEA.
It is easy to verify that a = (a1, a2, . . . , an) ∈ Sn is strong if and only if
ai = 1 for some i = 1, 2, . . . , n and a is sharp if and only if ai = 0 or 1 for all
i = 1, 2, . . . , n. We say that a CEA E is classical if E is affinely isomorphic
to Sn for some n ∈ N.
Theorem 4.5. A CEA E is strong if and only if E is classical.
Proof. Let E be a strong CEA with generators {a1, a2, . . . , an}. Define J : E →
Sn by J(a) = (λ1, λ2, . . . , λn) when a =
∑
λiai. If a, b ∈ E with a ⊥ b where
a =
∑
λiai, b =
∑
µiai, then
J(a + b)i = λi + µi ≤ 1
so J(a) ⊥ J(b) and J(a + b) = J(a + b). Also J(u) = un and if J(a) ⊥ J(b)
then a ⊥ b. Moreover, we see that J(λa) = λJ(a) for all λ ∈ [0, 1], a ∈ E
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and that J is surjective. It follows that J is an affine isomorphism so E is
classical. Conversely, suppose E is a classical CEA and let J : E → Sn be
an affine isomorphism. Let δi ∈ Sn be the element satisfying δi(j) = δij ,
i, j = 1, 2, . . . , n and let ai = J
–1(δi) ∈ E . If a ∈ E , then there exists a b ∈ Sn
given by
b = (λ1, λ2, . . . , λn) =
∑
λiδi
such that
a = J–1(b) = J–1
(∑
λiδi
)
=
∑
λiJ
–1(bi) =
∑
λiai
Since J is an isomorphism, this representation is unique. It follows that the
ai’s are linearly independent. Also,
u = J–1(un) = J
–1
(∑
δi
)
=
∑
J–1(δi) =
∑
ai
so {a1, a2, . . . , an} generates E . Hence, E is a strong CEA.
5 Informationally Complete Random Variables
We now view the CEA Sn of Section 4 in terms of classical probability theory.
Let X = {1, 2, . . . , n} and for every a = (λ1, λ2, . . . , λn) in Sn define the
function fa : X → [0, 1] by fa(i) = λi. We call fa a fuzzy event and a 7→ fa
maps Sn onto the set of fuzzy events F(X) on X . If a, b ∈ Sn with a ⊥ b,
we define fa+b(i) = fa(i) + fb(i) and for λ ∈ [0, 1] we define λfa = fλa. Then
F(X) becomes a CEA that is affinely isomorphic to Sn. If s = (µ1, µ2, . . . , µn)
is a state on Sn, we have the corresponding probability measure onX given by
µs(i) = µi. Denoting the set of states on Sn by Sn and the set of probability
measures on X by P(X) we see that (Sn,Sn) and (F(X),P(X)) essentially
coincide. In the literature, (F(X),P(X)) is called a fuzzy probability space
[1, 10].
We say that a strong CEA E with generators {ai} is sharp if the ai
are sharp, i = 1, 2, . . . , n. We can then identify fai with the set Γi =
{j ∈ X : fai(j) = 1}. Since
∑
ai = u, we have that
∑
fai = χX . It fol-
lows that faifaj = 0 for i 6= j so that Γi ∩ Γj = ∅ for i 6= j and
⋃
Γi = X .
Moreover, since
E =
{∑
λiai : λi ∈ [0, 1]
}
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we have that f =
∑
λifai for all f ∈ F(X). Hence, we can assume without
loss of generality that fai = χ{i}, i = 1, 2, . . . , n. The observable A = {ai}
on Sn corresponds to the observable A on F(X) given by Â(i) = χ{i}, i =
1, 2, . . . , n. We can thus identify Â with the random variable gA on X given
by gA(i) = i. By Theorem 4.4, if B is an observable on F(X), then B is a
postprocessing of Â so we can represent B by a random variable gB : X → Y
for some value space Y . In summary, if we have a sharp CEA, then we can
represent the observables on E by random variables on a setX = {1, 2, . . . , n}
and states on E are represented by probability measures on X . This reduces
the theory to classical probability.
Let A = (A(x1), A(x2), . . . , A(xn)) be an observable on a CEA E . If s is a
state on E , then its probability distribution ΦA,s is given by {s [A(x1)] , s [A(x2)] ,
. . . , s [A(xn)]}. We say that a collection of observables {A1, A2, . . . , Am} is in-
formationally complete if for any states s1, s2,ΦAi,s = ΦAi,s2, i = 1, 2, . . . , m,
implies that s1 = s2. Single informationally complete observables in Hilbert
space quantum mechanics are well understood [2, 12]. However, this is not
true for larger sets of observables. For example, we would like to characterize
pairs of observables (A1, A2) that are informationally complete where A1 and
A2 are not.
In this section, we consider informationally complete observables in sharp
CEA’s. Of course, this is a very strong restriction, but it may give some
insights for the general case. We then have the following situation. Let X =
{1, 2, . . . , n} and let P(X) be the set of probability measures on X . Every
µ ∈ P(X) has the form µ = (µ1, µ2, . . . , µn) where µi ∈ [0, 1],
∑
µi = 1. Let
R(X) be the set of random variables f : X → R. For f ∈ R(X), µ ∈ P(X)
the probability distribution is the measure on sets ∆ ⊆ R given by
Φf,µ(∆) = µ
[
f –1(∆)
]
=
∑
{µi : f(i) ∈ ∆}
We say that f ∈ R(X) is informationally complete (IC) if Φf,µ = Φf,ν implies
µ = ν. We use the notation |X| = n and assume that n ≥ 2.
Example 1. We show that when |X| = 2, then f is IC if and only if f is
not constant. If f is constant, then f(xi) = λ, i = 1, 2 and we have that
Φf,µ ({λ}) = Φf,ν ({λ}) = 1
It follows that Φf,µ = Φf,ν for all probability measures µ and ν so f is not
IC. If f is not constant, then f(1) 6= f(2) and we have that
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Φf,µ ({f(1)}) = µ1, Φf,µ ({f(2)}) = µ2 for any µ ∈ P(X). If ν ∈ P(X) is
another probability measure with ν = (ν1, ν2) and Φf,µ = Φf,ν then
µ1 = Φf,µ ({f(1)}) = Φf,ν ({f(1)}) = ν1
µ2 = Φf,µ ({f(2)}) = Φf,ν ({f(2)}) = ν2
Hence, µ = ν so f is IC.
In general we have the following result.
Theorem 5.1. A random variable f ∈ R(X) is IC if and only if f is injec-
tive.
Proof. If f(i) 6= f(j) for all i 6= j and Φf,µ = Φf,ν for µ, ν ∈ P(X) then
µi = Φf,µ ({f(i)}) = Φf,ν ({f(i)}) = νi
for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. Hence, µ = ν so f is IC. Conversely, suppose f is
not injective and assume without loss of generality that f(1) = f(2). Let
µ = (1/2, 1/2, 0, . . . , 0), ν = (1/4, 3/4, 0, . . . , 0). Then µ 6= ν but
Φf,µ ({f(1)}) = Φf,ν ({f(1)}) = 1
so Φf,µ = Φf,ν . Hence, f is not IC.
A set of two random variables {f, g} is IC if Φf,µ = Φf,ν and Φg,µ = Φg,ν
imply that µ = ν. Of course, if f is IC, then {f, g} is IC for g ∈ R(X). The
interesting case is when {f, g} is IC and neither f nor g is IC.
Example 2. We show that when |X| = 2, then {f, g} is IC if and only if
either f or g is IC. Indeed, if either f or g is IC then of course {f, g} is IC.
Conversely, suppose both f and g are not IC. Then by Example 1, f and g
are constant so f(1) = f(2) and g(1) = g(2). Let µ = (µ1, µ2), ν = (ν1, ν2)
be probability measures. Then
Φf,µ ({f(1)}) = Φf,ν ({f(1)}) = 1
and
Φg,µ ({g(1)}) = Φg,ν ({g(1)}) = 1
Hence, Φf,µ = Φf,ν and Φg,µ = Φg,ν but µ 6= ν in general so {f, g} is not IC.
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Example 3. Let |X| = 3 and let f, g ∈ R(X) where neither f nor g is IC.
By Theorem 5.1, f and g are not injective. If f(1) = f(2) and g(1) = g(2)
then {f, g} is not IC. Indeed, let µ, ν ∈ P(X) with µ1 6= ν1 but
µ1 + µ2 = ν1 + ν2. We have that
Φf,µ ({f(1)}) = µ1 + µ2 = Φg,µ ({g(1)})
Φf,ν ({f(1)}) = ν1 + ν2 = Φg,ν ({g(1)})
Φf,µ ({f(3)}) = µ3 = Φg,µ ({g(3)})
Φf,ν ({f(3)}) = ν3 = Φg,ν ({g(3)})
Since µ3 = ν3 we have that Φf,µ = Φf,ν and Φg,µ = Φg,ν but µ 6= ν. Hence,
{f, g} is not IC. On the other hand if f(1) = f(2) 6= f(3) and
g(1) 6= g(2) = g(3), then {f, g} is IC. In this case, for µ, ν ∈ P(X) we have
that
Φf,µ ({f(1)}) = µ1 + µ2, Φf,µ ({f(3)}) = µ3
Φf,ν ({f(1)}) = ν1 + ν2, Φf,ν ({f(3)}) = ν3
Φg,µ ({g(1)}) = µ1, Φg,µ ({g(2)}) = µ2 + µ3
Φg,ν ({g(1)}) = ν1, Φg,ν ({g(2)}) = ν2 + ν3
If Φf,µ = Φf,ν and Φg,µ = Φg,ν then µ1 + µ2 = ν1 + ν2, µ3 = ν3 and µ1 = ν1,
µ2 + µ3 = ν2 + ν3. Hence, µ = ν so {f, g} is IC.
A random variable f ∈ R(X) gives a partition of X = {1, 2, . . . , n}
where {i} is a singleton if f(i) 6= f(j) for any j 6= i, {i, j} is a doubleton if
f(i) = f(j) and f(i) 6= f(k) for any k 6= i, j, etc. We denote the partition
for f by P (f). If A and B are partitions of X , then the set of intersections
of sets in A with sets in B (omitting the empty set) is denoted by A∩B. We
say that two random variables f, g ∈ R(X) are complementary if P (f)∩P (g)
consists of singleton sets.
Example 4. Let f, g be the first two random variables in Example 3.
Then P (f) = {{1, 2} , {3}}, P (g) = P (f) = P (f) ∩ P (g) and f, g are not
complementary. Next, let f, g be the second two random variables in
Example 3. Then P (f) = {{1, 2} , {3}}, P (g) = {{1} , {2, 3}} and we have
P (f) ∩ P (g) = {{1} , {2} , {3}}
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so f, g are complementary. Recall that in the first case, {f, g} were not IC
while in the second case {f, g} were IC. As we shall see, this is no accident.
As another example, let h1 ∈ R(X), where |X| = 5, with different values
h1(1), h1(2), . . . , h1(5) except h1(1) = h1(5) and h1(3) = h1(4). We then
have
P (h1) = {{1, 5} , {2} , {3, 4}}
If h2 ∈ R(X) satisfies h2(2) = h2(3) = h2(4) and the other values are
different we have
P (h2) = {{1} , {2, 3, 4} , {5}}
Hence, P (h1) ∩ P (h2) = {{1} , {2} , {3, 4} , {5}} so h1, h2 are not
complementary.
We say that f, g ∈ R(X) are strongly complementary if for all i ∈ X ,
either {i} ∈ P (f) or {i} ∈ P (g). For instance, none of the pairs of random
variables in Example 4 are strongly complementary. An example of a strongly
complementary pair is given by the partitions
P (f) = {{1, 2} , {3} , {4}} , P (g) = {{1} {2} , {3, 4}}
It is easy to check that a pair that is strongly complementary must be com-
plementary. Also, f, g ∈ R(X) are strongly complementary if and only if for
all i ∈ X either f(i) 6= f(j) or g(i) 6= g(j) for all j ∈ X with j 6= i.
Theorem 5.2. (i) If f, g ∈ R(X) are strongly complementary, then f, g are
IC. (ii) If f, g are IC, then f, g are complementary.
Proof. (i) Suppose f, g ∈ R(X) are strongly complementary. Let µ =
(µ1, µ2, . . . , µn) and ν = (ν1, ν2, . . . , νn) be states in P(X) and suppose that
Φf,µ = Φf,ν and Φg,µ = Φg,ν . For i ∈ X , either {i} ∈ P (f) or {i} ∈ P (g). In
the former case, we have
Φf,µ ({f(i)}) = µi = Φf,ν ({f(i)}) = νi
while in the latter case, we have
Φg,µ ({g(i)}) = µi = Φg,ν ({g(i)}) = νi
In this way, µi = νi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n so µ = ν.
(ii) Suppose that f, g are not complementary. Without loss of generality, we
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can assume that f(1) = f(2), g(1) = g(2) while the other values of f and g
are arbitrary. Let µ = (1, 0, . . . , 0) and ν = (0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) be states on X .
Then
Φf,µ ({f(1)}) = 1 = Φf,ν ({f(1)})
and
Φg,µ ({g(1)}) = 1 = Φg,ν ({g(1)})
But µ 6= ν so f, g are not IC.
The definitions and Theorem 5.2 extend to more than two random vari-
ables in a natural way. In the second illustration of Example 3, f, g are IC
but f, g are not strongly complementary. This shows that the converse of
Theorem 5.2(i) is false. Hence, strong complementary is a sufficient but not
necessary condition for IC.
Example 5. This example shows that the converse of Theorem 5.2(ii) is
false. Let X = {1, 2, 3, 4} and suppose f, g ∈ R(X) with
P (f) = {{1, 2} , {3, 4}} , P (g) = {{1, 3} , {2, 4}}
Then f, g are complementary. To show that f, g are not IC, consider the
distinct states
µ =
(
1
4
, 1
4
, 1
4
, 1
4
)
, ν =
(
1
3
, 1
6
, 1
6
, 1
3
)
We then have that
Φf,µ ({f(1)}) =
1
4
+ 1
4
= 1
2
= 1
3
+ 1
6
= Φf,ν ({f(1)})
Φf,µ ({f(3)}) =
1
4
+ 1
4
= 1
2
= 1
6
+ 1
3
= Φf,ν ({f(3)})
Φg,µ ({g(1)}) =
1
4
+ 1
4
= 1
2
= 1
3
+ 1
6
= Φg,ν ({g(1)})
Φg,µ ({g(2)}) =
1
4
+ 1
4
= 1
2
= 1
6
+ 1
3
= Φg,ν ({g(2)})
Hence, f, g are not IC.
We conclude from Example 5 that complementarity is a necessary but
not a sufficient condition for IC. It is an open problem to find a simple
characterization of IC for a pair {f, g} ⊆ R(X).
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6 Quantum Convex Effect Algebras
In this section we briefly consider CEA’s on a Hilbert space. A more complete
discussion is given in [5]. Let H be a finite-dimensional complex Hilbert
space and let LS(H) be the real linear space of self-adjoint operators on H .
We can order the elements of LS(H) using the cone of positive operators
K ⊆ LS(H). Letting I be the identity operator, we construct the CEA,
E(H) = [0, I] where [0, I] is a generating interval in LS(H). We call E(H)
a full quantum CEA and the elements of E(H) are called quantum effects.
The states on E(H) are precisely the density operators on H ; that is, the
operators ρ ∈ K with tr (ρ) = 1. We then have that ρ(a) = tr (ρa) for all
a ∈ E(H). Any CSEA of E(H) is called a quantum CSEA. It can be shown
that a ∈ E(H) is sharp if and only if a is a projection [10]. We denote the
spectrum of a ∈ E(H) by σ(a).
Lemma 6.1. A quantum effect a ∈ E(H) is strong if and only if 1 ∈ σ(a).
Proof. Suppose that 1 ∈ σ(a). By the spectral theorem a = p + b where
p is a one-dimensional projection and b ∈ E(H). If a is not strong, then
a ≤ λI, λ ∈ [0, 1). Hence, p ≤ a ≤ λI. Let φ be a unit eigenvector of p with
corresponding eigenvalue 1 so that pφ = φ. Then
1 = 〈φ, pφ〉 ≤ λ〈φ, φ〉 = λ
which is a contradiction. Hence, a is strong. Conversely, suppose that a ∈
E(H) is strong. If 1 6∈ σ(a), then ||a|| < 1. Since a ≤ ||a|| I, this gives a
contradiction. Hence ∈ σ(a).
It follows from Lemma 6.1 that strong effects need not be sharp.
It is not hard to show that if dimH = n, then dimLS(H) = n
2. Then
for any m ≤ n2 we can construct a CSEA F ⊆ E(H) with dimF = m. We
say that a quantum CSEA is commutative if all its elements commute. Of
course, F is commutative if and only if its generators mutually commute. It is
also clear, any full CEA is noncommutative. If a quantum CSEA F satisfies
dimF = 2, then F is commutative. This is because,its generators a1, a2
satisfy r1a1 + r2a2 = I for some r1, r2 ∈ R which implies a1a2 = a2a1. We
now give an example of a 3-dimensional noncommutative quantum CSEA.
Example 6. Let α, β ∈ E(C2) satisfy αβ 6= βα and 0 6∈ σ(α), σ(β).
Letting a1 =
α
2
, a2 =
β
2
, a3 = I −
α
2
− β
2
we have that a1, a2, a3 ∈ E(C
2) and
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a1 + a2 + a3 = I so A = {a1, a2, a3} is an observable. It is easy to check that
the ai’s do not commute and are linearly independent. Hence, the quantum
CSEA generated by A is noncommutative. Notice that 0, 1 6∈ σ(a1), σ(a2).
If 0 ∈ σ(a3), then there exists a unit vector φ ∈ C
2 such that
1
2
〈φ, αφ〉+ 1
2
〈φ, βφ〉 = 1. But then 〈φ, αφ〉 = 〈φ, βφ〉 = 1. This implies that
1 ∈ σ(a1) which is a contradiction. If 1 ∈ σ(a3), then there exists a unit
vector ψ ∈ C2 such that 1
2
〈φ, αφ〉+ 1
2
〈φ, βφ〉 = 0. As before, this implies
that 0 ∈ σ(a1) which is a contradiction. We conclude that 0, 1 6∈ σ(a3) so
a1, a2, a3 are not strong.
The next result characterizes the strong quantum CSEA’s.
Theorem 6.2. Let a1, . . . , am be generators for a strong CSEA F ⊆ E(H)
where dimH = n. Then m ≤ n, there exist nonzero projections Pi, i =
1, . . . , m and a projection Q with P1 + · · · + Pm + Q = I such that ai =
Pi +QaiQ and 0, 1 6∈ σ(QaiQ).
Proof. Let Pi be the projections onto the eigenspace {φ ∈ H : aiφ = φ}. Since
1 ∈ σ(ai), Pi 6= 0. Suppose aiφ = φ where φ 6= 0. Since
∑
ak = 1 we have
φ =
∑
akφ = aiφ+
∑
k 6=i
akφ = φ+
∑
k 6=i
akφ
Hence,
∑
k 6=i akφ = 0 so that
∑
k 6=i 〈φ, akφ〉 = 0. Since 〈φ, akφ〉 ≥ 0 we obtain
〈φ, akφ〉 = 0 for all k 6= i. Thus
〈
a
1/2
k φ, a
1/2
k φ
〉
= 0 so that a
1/2
k φ = 0 and we
have that akφ = 0. If k 6= i and aiψ = ψ, then by the above aiψ = 0. But
aiφ = φ so ψ and φ are eigenvectors with different eigenvalues. Hence, φ ⊥ ψ.
This implies that PiPj = PjPi = 0 whenever i 6= j. Let Q be the projection
given by Q = I −
∑m
i=1 Pi so that
∑
Pi + Q = I. Then QPi = PiQ = 0 for
i = 1, . . . , m. By the Spectral Theorem ai = Pi+ bi where bi is an effect with
0, 1 6∈ σ(bi). Since
Piaiφ = aiPiφ = Piφ
for all φ ∈ H we have that Piai = Pi. Hence,
ai − Pi =
(∑
Pj +Q
)
(ai − Pi) = Piai +Qai − Pi = Qai
We conclude that
bi = ai − Pi = Qai = QaiQ
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It follows from Theorem 6.2 that if S ⊆ E(H) is a strong CSEA with
dimH = n then dimS ≤ n. Moreover, if dimS = n then there are one-
dimensional projections P1, . . . , Pn with
∑
Pi=1 and S={
∑
λiPi : λi ∈ [0, 1]}.
We now give an example of a strong noncommutative quantum CSEA F .
This is surprising because by Theorem 4.5 we know that F must be classical.
Example 7. Let dimH = 5 and let F ⊆ E(H) be a strong CSEA with
dimF = 3. If a1, a2, a3 are generators of F , it follows from Theorem 6.2
that there exist nonzero projections P1, P2, P3 and a projection Q such that
P1 + P2 + P3 +Q = I and ai = Pi +QaiQ, 0, 1 6∈ σ(QaiQ). We can and will
assume that dimQ = 2 from which it follows that dimPi = 1, i = 1, 2, 3.
Since the Pi and Q mutually commute, they can be simultaneously
diagonalized and writing the ai as matrices we have
a1 =

1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0[ ]
0 0 0
b
0 0 0
 a2 =

0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0[ ]
0 0 0
c
0 0 0

a3 =

0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0[ ]
0 0 0
d
0 0 0

where [b] , [c] , [d] ∈ E(C2) satisfy [b] + [c] + [d] = I and 0, 1 6∈ σ ([b]) ,
σ ([c]) , σ ([d]). Except for satisfying the above conditions, the effects [b], [c],
[d] are arbitrary and we can choose them to be noncommutative as in
Example 6. Then a1, a2, a3 do not commute so F is a noncommutative
strong quantum CSEA. It is not hard to show that dimH = 5, dimF = 3
are the smallest dimensions for such an example.
Example 7 shows that the converse of the next theorem is false.
Theorem 6.3. If a quantum CSEA F is commutative, then F is strong.
Proof. Let F ⊆ E(H) be commutative with dimF = m and dimH = n.
Then F has m generators a1, . . . , am where a1, . . . , am mutually commute
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and are linearly independent. It follows that the ai are simultaneously di-
agonalizable so we can assume without loss of generality that a1, . . . , am
are diagonal n × n matrices ai = diag (a
j
i ), i = 1, . . . , m, j = 1, . . . , n,
where aji ∈ [0, 1]. Since a1, . . . , am are linearly independent, they span an
m-dimensional subspace V of the real linear space Rn. For b ∈ V we denote
the jth component of b by bj . We conclude that V = {
∑
µiai : µi ∈ R} and
F = {b ∈ V : bj ∈ [0, 1]}. It follows that V is isomorphic to Rm and F is
isomorphic to the classical CEA Sm via the map J(b)(j) = b
j , j = 1, . . . , m.
Applying Theorem 4.5, we conclude that F is strong.
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